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Executive Summary
As organizations focus on the digital transformation of 
their businesses, the importance of encryption as the 
cornerstone of security and privacy is increasingly vital. In 
2018, over 70 percent of internet traffic was encrypted. 
Experts believe that this figure is expected to rise to 80 
percent in 2019 (Google, 2019). Secure Sockets Layer  
(SSL, an older standard) and Transport Layer Security  
(TLS, a newer standard) certificates are essential 
to encryption because they authorize all encrypted 
communication between machines. SSL/TLS certificates are 
instrumental in protecting privacy and improving security, 
providing each machine with a unique machine identity. 
They control the flow of sensitive data to authorized 
machines and are used in everything from website 
transactions and mobile devices to smart city initiatives, 
robots, artificial intelligence algorithms and containers in 
the cloud.  
Despite the pivotal role encryption plays in our digital 
economy and across the internet, the processes needed 
to protect digital certificates are not well understood 
or widely followed. As a result, SSL/TLS certificates are 
often poorly protected, making them attractive targets for 
attackers. In fact, illegitimate access to SSL/TLS certificates 
has played a key role in several high-profile, high-impact 
breaches—such as Snowden, Sony and Equifax. 
To shine a light on the availability of SSL/TLS certificates on 
the dark web, the Evidence-based Cybersecurity Research 
Group at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at 
Georgia State University and the University of Surrey 
spearheaded a research program, sponsored by Venafi. This 
report details the preliminary findings of the research and 
outlines the volume of SSL/TLS certificates for sale on the 
dark web, including information on how they are packaged 
and sold to attackers. These certificates can be used to 
eavesdrop on sensitive communications, spoof websites, 
trick consumers and steal data. The long-term goal of this 
research is to gain a more thorough understanding of the 
role SSL/TLS certificates play in the economy of the dark 
web as well as how they are being used by attackers. 
This is the first of three reports—the first of their kind—
focused on the underground SSL/TLS marketplace and 
its role in the wider cybercrime economy. This report 
will show that there is a machine identity-as-a-service 
marketplace on the dark web, where fraudulent TLS 
certificates are readily available for purchase. 
Key findings:
• Five of the Tor network markets observed—Dream 
Market, Wall Street Market, BlockBooth, Nightmare 
Market and Galaxy3—offer a steady supply of  
SSL/TLS certificates, along with a range of related 
services and products.
• One representative search of these five marketplaces 
uncovered 2,943 mentions for “SSL” and 75 for “TLS.” 
In comparison, there were only 531 mentions for 
“ransomware” and just 161 for “zero day” exploits.
• SSL/TLS certificates are often packaged with 
crimeware services and products, such as malicious 
websites and ransomware.
• Certain marketplaces, like Dream Market, appear 
to specialize in the sale of SSL/TLS certificates and 
related services. 
• Some underground marketplaces focus on packaging 
services with SSL/TLS certificates. For example, 
some sellers offer “aged” domains, after-sale support 
and integration with a range of legitimate payment 
processors—including Stripe, PayPal and Square.
• At least one vendor on BlockBooth promises to issue 
certificates from reputable certificate authorities. The 
seller also offers forged documentation, which allows 
attackers to present themselves as trusted U.S. or U.K. 
companies for less than $2,000. 
• Prices for certificates vary from $260 to $1,600, 
depending on the type of certificate and scope of 
additional services offered.
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The Hypertext Transfer Protocol and TLS Certificates 
The internet is made up of a large number of globally 
connected computer networks (Tanenbaum and Wetherall 
2011). To allow easy communication among these computer 
networks and to support the transmission of data between 
clients and servers, common communication protocols  
have been developed. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 
is the underlying protocol used by the World Wide Web 
to support users’ access to the internet. HTTP defines how 
messages should be formatted and transmitted between 
computers connected to the internet and determines how 
applications and web servers should communicate  
and respond to queries. For example, when you type  
google.com in your browser, your computer sends an 
HTTP command to the Google web server and directs it 
to fetch and transmit the requested webpage. Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is the secure version of 
HTTP. This protocol encrypts the communication between 
clients’ browsers and the web servers they access, using 
one of two secure protocols: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 
or Transport Layer Security (TLS). Both protocols use 
an “asymmetric” Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system to 
provide confidential, encrypted communication between 
clients and servers by binding a “public” key and a “private” 
key (Kim et al 2017) with a SSL/TLS certificate issued by a 
certificate authority. Anything encrypted with the public key 
can only be decrypted by the private key, and vice versa. 
To facilitate confidential communications with clients, 
organizations need to install SSL or TLS certificates 
onto their web servers. These certificates bind together 
two important components: either a domain or server 
name with an organizational identity and location. When 
installed on a web server, the SSL or TLS certificate 
activates the padlock, and the HTTPS protocol allows 
secure connections from a web server to a browser. To 
support the sensitive operation of identity verification, 
SSL/TLS certificates and their corresponding public and 
private encryption keys are issued by trusted certificate 
authorities. Certificate authorities are charged with 
the task of employing stringent validation processes to 
ensure SSL/TLS certificates are issued only to legitimate 
companies, organizations and individuals. An extended 
validation (EV) SSL/TLS certificate is designed to be the 
most trusted certificate on the market. EV certificates 
create verified identities and are only issued after the 
certificate authority verifies the identity of the requester 
using robust specifications laid out by the CA/Browser 
forum and Microsoft. These guidelines require that the 
requester provide several pieces of identifying information, 
including the company’s DUNS number (unique numeric 
identifiers assigned to a single business entity) or a letter 
from a certified public accountant who can verify the 
legitimacy of the business, when a certificate is requested. 
After submitting the request, the certificate authority is 
required to authenticate the legal existence and identity 
of the requesting party by verifying the company’s trade 
name and its operational and physical existence, as well as 
its ownership of the domain name. EV certificates should 
be issued only after these steps are successfully completed. 
Importantly, other types of SSL/TLS certificates—uch as 
organization validated (OV) and domain validated (DV)—
are also used to authorize encrypted communication. 
However, the verification information required by certificate 
authorities for these types of SSL/ TLS certificates varies, 
and once they are in use by the requester, the security 
feedback to users about the validity of their certificates from 
browsers may also vary. 
The keys and certificates issued by certificate authorities are 
used during the beginning of each encrypted communication 
to authenticate the identity of the machines. However, if 
these certificates are fraudulent, compromised, forged or 
tampered with, they can be powerful tools for attackers. 
Specifically, if a trusted certificate authority is breached and 
private keys are stolen from it, the stolen certificates could 
be sold in the online underground market on the dark web 
to malicious parties. In turn, they could use them to move 
silently between trusted machines, “listen” to encrypted 
traffic, and escalate privileges to access sensitive data (Gu 
and Gu 2015). Moreover, if the verification processes used 
by trusted certificate authorities to verify the identity of the 
requesting party can be circumvented or spoofed, malicious 
actors can be issued a SSL/TLS certificate that delivers the 
highest levels of trust (i.e., an EV certificate). This allows 
attackers to create “trustworthy” spoofed or malicious 
websites and encrypt the traffic between malicious servers 
to targeted users, making it more difficult to identify 
problematic behavior.  
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Are SSL/TLS Certificates for Sale on the Dark Web?
Research Design and Methodology 
Malicious actors can get information on either stolen 
machine identities or code-signing certificates and can even 
establish “legitimate” identities for the spoofed websites 
they build in an effort to victimize their targets (Kim et al. 
2017; Kozak et al. 2018) through the illegal online markets 
that populate the dark web. Online environments that 
support the convergences of cybercriminals, enablers, 
targets and guardians exist on both the surface web 
(which contains all the websites and computers that are 
accessible to anyone with an internet connection) and 
on the deep web (which is up to 500 times larger than 
the surface web and consists of websites that are not 
searchable, including innocuous sites like business intranets 
and medical databases; Kremling & Parker 2017). The dark 
web (also known as the “darknet”) forms a subset of the 
deep web. Due to the extended anonymity that it allows, 
the dark web provides an attractive online platform for the 
development of networks and allegiances between criminals 
and enablers, as well as for the initiation and development 
of illegal activities (Maimon and Louderback 2019). A dark 
web market is a commercial website that operates via 
anonymous networks, such as The Onion Router (Tor) or 
the Invisible Internet Project (I2P). 
Online forums and market users who employ public 
communication platforms over the dark web often create 
unique public threads that aim to ask a question or 
advertise a service or a product (Hutchings and Clayton 
2016). The posting entity gives a description of the service 
or product (either needed or provided) and includes 
details on pricing information, payment and contact 
information (Holt and Lampke 2010). These markets offer 
the hardware, software and materials needed to initiate 
all types of cyber-dependent crimes (i.e., illegal activities 
that can only be performed using a computer, computer 
networks or other forms of information communication 
technology (McGuire and Dowling 2013)), as well as the 
sensitive data harvested from victims of cyber-dependent 
crimes—like Social Security numbers, credit card numbers, 
names and addresses (Yip et al. 2013). 
The premise for this research project is that among the 
wide range of illegal commodities that are offered for sale 
on these online markets and forums, it may be possible to 
find evidence for the sale and purchase of compromised, 
fraudulent and forged TLS certificates. Specifically, Kim and 
colleagues (2017) have recently alerted to the presence of 
a code-signing certificate (i.e., certificates that guarantee 
the authenticity of a software publisher and integrity of the 
software) market over the darknet. Kozak and associates 
(2018) have further documented the operation of four 
dark web vendors that issue code-signing certificates for 
the purpose of abuse. However, we are not aware of any 
previous research that provides evidence for the existence 
of a market for compromised, stolen and forged  
SSL/TLS certificates in the dark web. Therefore, our 
research objective was to seek evidence of their existence 
in underground markets and assess the prevalence of  
SSL/TLS certificates as a commodity in the dark web.
To accomplish our research objective, we dived into online 
markets and hacker forums that were active on the Tor 
network, I2P and the Freenet during the data collection 
period from October 2018–January 2019 and searched for 
“for sale” listings of stolen, fake and forged TLS certificates. 
Our research team discovered close to 60 relevant online 
market webpages on the Tor network, 17 webpages on I2P, 
and no relevant webpages on the Freenet (see Appendices 
A and B for the list of dark web markets we monitored). 
To explore for the presence of SSL- and TLS-related 
ads in each market, we typed in “TLS certificates” and 
“SSL certificates” in the search bar of each market. We 
performed 16 weekly searches across all 60 websites during 
the project period. 
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Results 
We observed evidence for the relevance of SSL/TLS 
certificates in the cybercrime ecosystem in five of the 
Tor network markets we observed: Dream Market, Wall 
Street Market, BlockBooth, Nightmare Market and Galaxy3. 
Table 1 presents a typical summary from one of our 
weekly searches on the number of mentions of SSL and 
TLS certificate listings. Note that the number of mentions 
we observed did not vary significantly throughout the 
duration of the project. For comparison purposes, in this 
table, we juxtapose the number of SSL/TLS certificates 
mentions with the number of mentions for two other 
popular products on these markets: ransomware and 
zero-day exploits. As may be observed in the table, there 
is a considerable variation with respect to the number 
of mentions of SSL/TLS certificates across the markets 
observed. While the number of mentions of SSL/TLS 
certificates is high on the Dream Market, it is lower on the 
Wall Street Market and Galaxy3, and it’s even lower on 
BlockBooth and the Nightmare Market. Interestingly, the 
number of mentions of SSL certificates is significantly higher 
than the number of mentions for both ransomware and 
zero-day exploits in three out of the five markets.  
Figure 1 presents a screenshot of a typical ad in which SSL 
certificates were mentioned in the Wall Street Market. 
Note that some of the commodities offered for sale on this 
market are malware, security vulnerabilities and exploits, 
as well as stolen accounts and credit card credentials. The 
vendor in this ad provides the design of “trustworthy” 
e-commerce stores aimed to support the operation of 
online fraudulent activity. SSL certificates are mentioned 
second in the list of services offered by this vendor, 
along with “aged domains” (i.e., websites that have been 
registered and active for a long period of time, which makes 
the site appear to be more legitimate. SSL/TLS certificates 
and aged domains are used to convey trust to website 
visitors and search engines. 
Web Name SSL Certificates TLS Certificates Ransomware Zero-Day Exploits
Dream Market 2912 64 512 160
Wall Street Market 10 4 13 1
BlockBooth 3 1 0 0
Nightmare Market 2 0 5 0
Galaxy3 16 7 1 0
Table 1. Mentions Count for Search Perfomed on December 3rd 
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A visit to this vendor’s website reveals important details 
about the operation. Figure 2, for example, discloses more 
details about the vendor, along with an explicit statement 
regarding the proposed website’s goal (i.e., online fraud). 
Figure 3 presents a more detailed list of services than those 
presented in Figure 1, as well as a list of services that will 
not be provided by the vendor under this umbrella. Finally, 
Figure 4 shows the asking price for the vendor’s service 
($170), the number of products already sold (10) and 
customer ratings (which seems to be very high).      
Figure 1. SSL Certificates Sold along with Website Design Services (Wall Street Market)
Figure 2. SSL Certificates Sold to Create Fraudulent Website for E-Commerce
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Figure 3. SSL Certificates and Services to Create Fraudulent Websites 
(Wall St. Market)
Figure 4. Price, Previous Sales and Customer Ratings of Fraudulent Websites 
with SSL/TLS Certificates
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Similarly, Figure 5 presents evidence for another vendor 
on the Dream Market. This vendor’s ad, and many others 
like it, mentions the issuance of SSL certificates and the use 
of aged domains as key services provided by this vendor. 
Two insights are worth mentioning. First, this vendor’s 
presentation of the service provided is subtle and implied 
(unlike the language used in the previous ad). And second, 
the price for this service is less than €200. 
Figure 5. SSL Certificates Sold With Website Design Services (Dream Market)
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Figure 6. Kali SSL Strip Tool (Dream Market)
SSL/TLS certificates were also mentioned in various tutorials 
produced by anonymous authors. In addition, we found 
evidence of the availability of SSL stripping tools in the 
Dream Market. SSL stripping is a specific type of man-in-
the-middle attack in which an attacker can prevent a web 
browser from upgrading to an SSL connection to HTTP 
or HTTPs. These attackers typically go unnoticed by users. 
SSL strip tools allow attackers to strip away the encryption 
offered by HTTPS links, and they also make it possible 
to redirect and map those links to homograph-similar 
HTTPS links. 
Figure 6 presents a For Sale ad of a Kali SSL Strip tool for 
less than $5.
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Figure 7. EV Certificates of US Companies—No Doc or Verification Required
Although SSL certificate mentions in both Dream Market 
and Wall Street Market are primarily packaged as either 
website design services or for stripping encryption of HTTPS 
links, the mentions on BlockBooth typically offer a standalone 
service that provides EV certificate issuance for interested 
parties. In Figure 7, we present a screenshot of an ad posted 
by the vendor ‘bulkaccounts’ that advertises the vendor’s 
ability to issue EV certificates for U.S. companies without 
asking potential clients for any verifying information. The 
cost for each certificate starts at $1,300. In the description 
section of the ad, more details are provided about the types 
of services offered. One notable finding from this section 
is the vendor’s promise to supply EV certificates from 
reputable and trusted certificate authorities. Additionally, the 
vendor promises to provide full documentation for forged 
companies, including D-U-N-S numbers.
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Figure 8. EV Certificates for U.K. companies—No Doc or Verification Required
Figure 8 presents a screenshot of an ad posted again by 
bulkaccounts. In it, the vendor advertises issuance of EV 
certificates for U.K. companies without asking potential 
clients for any verifying information. The advertised cost 
for each certificate starts at $1,000. However, after contact 
with the vendor, it seems that the true asking price for 
this product is closer to $1,600. After reading through 
the description section of the ad, we find similar details to 
those offered for the issuance of its EV certificates for U.S. 
companies: The vendor promises to supply EV certificates 
from reputable and trusted certificate authorities, along 
with documentation for the forged companies. Importantly, 
since registration of a U.K. company seems to be more 
complicated than that of a U.S. company, the vendor also 
offers company formation services.
Figure 8 presents a screenshot of the post advertising 
this service. 
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Figure 9. U.K. Company Formation Service
As indicated in Figure 9, the vendor offers full support in 
establishing a company’s identity in the U.K., in addition 
to all of the required legal documentation associated with 
this process. The client only needs to provide the company 
and owner names as well as some form of physical address. 
The charge for this service is $150. If buyers don’t have a 
physical address, the vendor offers to provide one for an 
extra $100. 
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Appendix A. Tor Network Markets Monitored  
Appendix B. I2P Network Markets Monitored  
Dream Market
Wall Street
Empire Market
Silk Road 3.1
Rapture
Tochka/Point 
Cannazon
CGMC
Berlusconi Market
AltBay 
The Majestic Garden
Olympus 
Midland City
Black Market
Cave Tor
Valhalla 
Under Market
BlockBooth
Apollon 
DutchDrugz’s 
Psychedelicum
Dutch Magic
CarlieUK Cocaine
Pushing Taboo
Cocaine Market
The French Connection
Glasswerkz Australia
AlphaBay
Zion
Drug Market
Green Road
EuCanna
The Peoples Drug Store
Smokeables
CannabisUK
Nightmare 
Fresh Onion
0day forum
Hidden Wikis
Hacking forum 
Free Hacks
The Hub
Dread
DNMAvengers
LINKS Onion 
OnionDir
Amazon GC
Hidden Answers 
Stack Wolfs
Imperial
Black White
Hacker Group
Rent-A-Hacker
Chinese Darknet Market
PlaceMarket 
German-Plaza
Galaxy 3
Legwork
Eepstatus 
Exchanged
Lifebox
Black market
Visibility
Dumpteam
Hidden Answers 
Chan
Anongw
Anonsfw
Difracker
Darknetnow
Dark realm
Dead
Hidden Answers 
I2P forum
